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Introduction
The Federal Reserve (Fed) undertook numerous measures to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis that started in August 2007. Aside from easing the stance of monetary policy using its conventional tools, the central bank eased the terms with which it provided liquidity to depository institutions and launched a range of new programs to provide liquidity to other institutions. This article explains how and why the Fed engaged in such an unusual effort, whether the liquidity facilities operated as expected, and what the effects of the facilities were on financial markets.
The idea that a central bank should provide liquidity to support the financial system goes back to the 19th century work of Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot. Bagehot suggested that in a liquidity crisis, a central bank should lend freely, at a high rate of interest relative to the pre-crisis period, to any borrower with good collateral (Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth, and Soussa (2000) ). Central banks may be best suited to provide liquidity because they have better information about the solvency of banks or because they have the ability to finance the entire banking sector's liquidity needs by virtue of their size and their unique ability to issue money (Flannery (1996) ).
Since the Great Depression, the Fed has provided liquidity to individual institutions by way of its discount window, through which the Fed makes fully collateralized short-term loans to depository institutions at a penalty rate. While the window has traditionally met institutions' unusual, short-term funding needs, there is evidence that firms are reluctant to come to the window because of a perceived stigma. Furthermore, the window is not open to non-depository institutions, which have taken on an increasingly important role in financial intermediation over the past 30 years (Adrian and Shin (2010) ).
During the crisis, the Fed initially adjusted the terms of discount window use to expand liquidity provision to depository institutions. It proceeded to introduce numerous additional facilities to increase the flexibility with which institutions could access liquidity, to broaden the set of institutions eligible to access liquidity, and to mitigate institutions' 2 traditional hesitance to draw on such facilities.
1 The Fed's unprecedented response and the active use of the new programs present a unique opportunity to assess the effectiveness of central bank liquidity facilities.
We begin this article by reviewing Federal Reserve liquidity provision before the financial crisis. We proceed to discuss how and why the Fed expanded its liquidity provision during the crisis through an extraordinary range of new and existing programs. We then assess the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the liquidity facilities, including whether the programs operated as expected, as well as their effects on financial markets.
The last section concludes.
Background
The Federal Reserve uses open market operations as its principal tool to manage reserves in the banking system and thereby control the federal (fed) funds rate. To add reserves on a "permanent" (or long-term) basis, for example, the Fed buys securities in the secondary market. To add reserves on a "temporary" (or short-term) basis, it engages in repurchase agreements (repos) whereby it buys securities while agreeing to resell them at a later date. In either case, the Fed transacts with the "primary dealers" (dealers with a trading relationship with the Fed), with reserve balances affected when the Fed receives or sends funds to a dealer's account at its clearing bank.
The discount window operates as a backstop, providing a source of reserves to individual depository institutions when conditions in the fed funds market tighten or when depository institutions face short-term funding pressures. "Primary credit" lending, in particular, is available on a short-term basis to institutions with strong financial positions and ample capital (the window also offers "secondary credit" to institutions that do not qualify for primary credit and "seasonal credit" to small and medium-sized institutions with a recurring pattern of seasonal funding needs). Discount window loans are offered at a rate above the fed funds rate and must be fully collateralized.
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While the Fed's traditional framework for liquidity provision has generally been adequate, there have also been signs of its limitations. In particular, the effectiveness of the discount window is thought to be limited by the reluctance of depository institutions to approach the window because of a perceived stigma (see, for example, Clouse (1994) , Peristiani (1998), and Furfine (2003) ). The stigma arises from a perception that market participants will draw adverse inferences about an institution's financial condition if its borrowing were to become known. To mitigate stigma, the Fed has historically not released the names of borrowers from the window, although the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 now requires that the Fed disclose details of discount window loans with a two-year lag.
Concerns about stigma also motivated a key change to the discount window in 2003.
Until then, the main lending rate was typically set below the fed funds rate, creating an incentive for institutions to borrow from the window. To compensate for this incentive, the Fed required institutions to exhaust other sources of funds before coming to the window and to explain their need for credit. This requirement is thought to have contributed to stigma, while also increasing uncertainty about an institution's ability to access the window.
The 2003 change created a "no-questions-asked" policy for primary credit borrowing, potentially reducing such stigma. At the same time, the lending rate was set above the target fed funds rate, removing the incentive for institutions to borrow from the window under normal circumstances.
Aside from lending to depository institutions, section 13( (2002)). The Fed also established temporary swap arrangements with the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, and augmented the facility in place with the Bank of Canada. The agreements allowed the foreign central banks to draw U.S. dollars in exchange for local currency, which could then be lent to local banks to facilitate settlement of dollar transactions (Kos (2001) ).
Federal Reserve Response to the Crisis
The Federal Reserve employed both conventional and unconventional policy on an unprecedented scale during the financial crisis. To address the deteriorating economic outlook, the Fed lowered the fed funds target rate 10 times between September 2007 and December 2008, to an ultimate level close to zero. Moreover, to address the disruptions in financial markets, the Federal Reserve introduced or expanded liquidity facilities, provided support for specific institutions, and engaged in direct purchases of assets. The liquidity facilities employed and some of their characteristics are listed in Table 1 .
a. Liquidity Provision to Banks
The start of the financial crisis, and the initial policy responses, are often dated to (Gorton and Metrick (2012) ). As shown in Figure 2 , for example, the overnight agency and agency MBS repo spreads to Treasury repo, which were historically quite narrow, started widening out in the second half of 2007, and were especially wide in early 2008.
To address liquidity pressures in the term funding markets relied on by dealers, the 
Liquidity Facility Effectiveness
The Federal Reserve's unprecedented liquidity provision during the crisis has Given such difficulties, it is not surprising that many of the studies on the facilities focus on changes in market prices in narrow windows around facility announcements and/or operations. Such an approach can successfully isolate the market's response to a program's effects, but assumes that prices would not have changed in the absence of the events. Moreover, the approach does not capture the full effects of a program to the extent that pertinent events occur outside the windows. In addition, even if an analysis does cleanly identify short-term effects, it does not necessarily follow that such changes would not have been observed in subsequent months or years without the facility, and it does not consider the program's longer-term effects (e.g., in subsequent crises), be they positive (e.g., decreased market fragility) or negative (e.g., increased moral hazard).
In considering the effects of the facilities as well as their operations, a further point to note is the programs' limited mandate. The facilities were not intended to address credit concerns or capital shortages. Rather, they were intended to mitigate the liquidity disruptions in financial markets by providing collateralized, short-term loans to creditworthy institutions at an interest rate higher than the normal cost of funds. It is along these dimensions that the operations of the facilities and their effects on financial markets are assessed.
a. Did the Facilities Operate as Expected?
We first assess facility effectiveness by considering whether the facilities operated in accord with lender-of-last-resort principles and whether they were able to overcome borrower aversion to central bank borrowing. That is, we consider whether the facilities provided funding at a penalty rate to the normal cost of funds (albeit not such a penalty that they would not be used at times of crisis), whether the borrowings were well collateralized, and whether the facilities were able to overcome the stigma that is thought to affect discount window borrowing. Our intent here is not to scrutinize the features of the various programs, but to ask whether the evidence from the facilities' utilization is broadly consistent with lender-of-last-resort principles.
The pattern of borrowing across the facilities as a whole, as well as most individual facilities, supports the conjecture that loan pricing was largely appropriate. Most facilities garnered significant participation at their inception, when market disruptions were acute, 12 but then saw participation fall off as market conditions improved. The high utilization during the crisis suggests that the pricing was not so onerous as to preclude participation and that some of the traditional hesitance to borrow from the Fed may have been reduced.
The rapid decline in facility usage as market conditions improved suggests that pricing was generally set at a penalty to the normal cost of funds.
There were some exceptions to this penalty pricing rule, as might be expected given the wide range of facilities. Single-tranche open-market operations, for example, were structured as an extension of the Fed's regular open market operations and were thus intended to allocate the full quantity of offered collateral at a market determined rate.
Pricing for the TAF was also market determined, which resulted in a high borrowing rate relative to the pre-crisis period at inception, but a rate which declined sharply as conditions in the funding markets improved. Nonetheless, the main finding that emerges from across the facilities, and emphasized by the pattern of amounts outstanding in Figures 4 and 5, is that lending for the facilities was suitably priced.
There is also evidence that the liquidity facility borrowings were well collateralized.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether the particular haircuts imposed on collateral were appropriate, nearly all of the programs either required that borrowings be overcollateralized or that fees be imposed to provide a cushion against losses. The AMLF was an exception in that borrowings were collateralized, but not overcollateralized (that is, no haircut was applied), but asset-backed commercial paper is itself overcollateralized. The fact that the Fed profited from the facilities (Fleming and Klagge (2011)) and did not suffer any credit losses is consistent with the facilities having provided well-collateralized loans to creditworthy institutions at a penalty rate.
The issue of borrowing stigma during the crisis is addressed most directly by Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and Shrader (2011) . They compare participation in TAF auctions with discount window borrowing and find evidence of significant discount window stigma.
Specifically, they find that banks were willing to pay an average premium of 37 basis points at the height of the crisis to borrow from the TAF rather than the discount window. They further uncover evidence rationalizing banks' hesitance to use the discount window by 13 finding that banks visiting the window tended to face a rise in borrowing costs and decrease in stock prices relative to banks that did not visit the window. Note that the finding of discount window stigma relative to the TAF is implicit evidence of the TAF having been able to overcome the traditional borrowing stigma.
Another study, by Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) , focuses on repo funding extended by money market funds and securities lenders to the shadow banking system. It finds that firms that backed their repo financing with riskier/less liquid collateral prior to the rescue of Bear Stearns borrowed greater amounts from both the PDCF and the TSLF. The PDCF result only holds for firms relying more on "private" collateral than agency collateral, which the authors argue is consistent with there being a stigma to borrowing from the PDCF. They also uncover evidence that TSLF borrowing was cheaper than market borrowing, perhaps reflecting a stigma attached to TSLF borrowing.
b. What was the Effect of the Facilities on Financial Markets?
We next assess the effects of the facilities on financial markets. Much of the work in this area focuses on the two facilities that were introduced first during the crisis and that argues that the announcement of the TAF increased the risk premium in financial and other rates because it was interpreted as signaling that the crisis was worse than previously thought. After controlling for risk spreads, he finds that the TAF appears to have had little effect on the three-month LIBOR-Treasury bill spread.
In addition to studies that jointly examine the effects of the TAF and central bank liquidity swaps, several studies assess the swaps by themselves. Fleming and Klagge (2010) and Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2011) The best empirical evidence for the dealer facilities is for the TSLF, and it suggests that the program was effective at mitigating strains in secured funding markets. Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2009) characterize the TSLF and find that the initial operations were associated with a narrowing of repo spreads between less liquid and more liquid collateral. Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010) show statistically that changes in the amount outstanding under the facility are negatively related to changes in repo spreads. Interestingly, both studies show that the narrowing of spreads emanated more from an increase in Treasury repo rates than from a decrease in repo rates on less liquid collateral, suggesting that much of the effects of the facility came through easing the shortage of liquid Treasury collateral.
Duygan-Bump, Parkinson, Rosengren, Suarez, and Willen (forthcoming) provide some of the most convincing evidence on the effects of the liquidity facilities in their study of the AMLF. Unlike other studies, which mostly examine aggregate data, their study uses detailed transactions and rate data to exploit both time series and cross-sectional variation using a differences-in-differences approach. They show that facility participation was more likely among funds with larger redemptions and with a larger share of asset-backed commercial paper in their portfolios. They further find that money market mutual fund outflows decreased more for funds that held more eligible collateral. In addition, they show that yields on eligible commercial paper decreased significantly relative to yields on comparable but ineligible paper. Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2011) overview the CPFF and offer a preliminary analysis of its effects. They find that the start of the CPFF precipitated a rise in term commercial paper issuance as redemption pressures eased. The further find that the expansion of the CPFF was accompanied by a narrowing of the spreads between commercial paper rates and comparable OIS rates. They note while the timing suggests the program had meaningful effects, further work is needed to determine the extent of such effects.
Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010) model the effects of liquidity facilities with haircuts and examine empirically the expansion of the TALF to include existing asset-backed securities. They find that required rates of return on commercial mortgage-backed 17 securities declined when the program was announced, increased when a rating agency change made many securities ineligible for the program, and declined again when the program was implemented. Yields of both eligible and ineligible securities reacted to program news, consistent with the idea that the program had broad benefits. They also find that yields of individual securities rose when it became known that those particular securities were ineligible for the program, and that this reaction was particularly strong when capital constraints were tight.
Campbell, Covitz, Nelson, and Pence (2011) uncover broadly similar results in their evaluation of the TALF. Specifically, they find that TALF announcements substantially affected the pricing of highly rated auto asset-backed securities and commercial mortgagebacked securities. However, they find less evidence that the acceptance or rejection of particular securities from the TALF affected the pricing of those securities. They conclude that the TALF may have improved market liquidity and functioning as a whole without providing substantial subsidies to individual securities.
c. Areas for Further Research
The review of extant work immediately suggests that greater quantitative evaluation of the liquidity facilities is warranted. As noted, there is little or no research assessing some of the programs (i.e., single-tranche open market operations) and only descriptive work assessing others (e.g., PDCF), despite their size and importance. For other facilities, the existing work is mostly limited in focus. Research on the TSLF, for example, is limited to the analysis of repo rates for relatively liquid securities, and does not consider the effects on haircuts or on rates for less liquid securities.
In addition, few studies to date have examined which particular institutions participated in the various liquidity programs and how their disparate participation relates to firm characteristics and performance. This likely reflects the absence until after the crisis of publicly available institution-specific participation data. When the programs were operating, the Fed released aggregate quantity and rate data for the various facilities, but 18 not information on transactions with specific counterparties. Moreover, there was little expectation at the time that transaction-level data would ever be released. For illustrative purposes, summary transactions information for the TAF and PDCF is reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 One potential use of the new data is to better understand which firms participated in the liquidity programs and why. Did firms borrow from the Fed because they needed the liquidity or did they borrow because liquidity was available at advantageous rates? As mentioned, there is some early work exploring these issues, including the Duygan-Bump, Parkinson, Rosengren, Suarez, and Willen (forthcoming) and Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) studies discussed earlier, both of which seem to support the conjecture that usage was greatest among institutions that needed liquidity. In addition, Acharya, Fleming, Hrung, and Sarkar (2011) find that firms with higher leverage and worse stock price performance over the crisis were more apt to bid in TSLF operations, likely to bid higher rates, and tended to bid for larger amounts. The public release of the transactions data should spur further work along these lines.
Another use of the new data is to better understand stigma. Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and Shrader (2011)) use TAF transaction data in their study of discount window stigma and relate stigma to firm characteristics and policy changes. Stigma is thought to have been mitigated in some of the new facilities because of their structure, but little work has examined this issue aside from the abovementioned study and the work of Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) . The new data provide an opportunity to more fully characterize stigma across the facilities and to better understand what program features, market conditions, and firm characteristics drive it.
Aside from better understanding the utilization and effectiveness of the facilities, the new data also provide an opportunity to test hypotheses about the effects of data disclosure. Is disclosure harmful? If so, how does this process work? Is there evidence that firms that borrowed during the crisis were harmed when information about their borrowings was released? If not, then why might firms be hesitant to borrow in the future with the knowledge that their names will only be released with a lag? The work of Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
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One-month Three-month Note: The figure plots the overnight agency and agency MBS repo spreads to the overnight Treasury repo rate. 
